

EXCISE

(13)

November 13, 1962

ARA - Mr. Martin

Mr. Cleveland has asked if you would review the attached memorandum as soon as possible and give him any comments you may have directly.

William H. Brubeck

SECRET Attachment

Attachment:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CIO/ME

REVIEWED by *bh* DATE *3/14/87*

RELEASE  DECLASSIFY  
 EXCISE  DECLASSIFY in PART  
 DENY  Non-responsive info.  
VOL DO or PA exemptions *ex*

TS authority to: *TS* CAGE

CLASSIFY as *TS* CAGE  
 DOWNGRADE TS to  S or  C OADR

*fact 12/1/87*

November 13, 1962

TO : S - Mr. Ball

FROM : IO - Harlan Cleveland

SUBJECT: Supplementary Instructions for  
Messrs. Stevenson and McCloy.

1. The meeting at 3:00 p.m. is being held at Kuznetsov's request. The character of the meeting can therefore be developed from the opening presentation by the Soviets.

2. The Secretary has orally authorized Mr. McCloy to discuss, if it comes up naturally in the conversation, the substance of the message sent to the Soviets last night; that if they will give us assurances that the IL-28 bombers will be removed from Cuba, within, say, three weeks, we are prepared to lift the quarantine forthwith without awaiting the actual removal of the bombers. We will, of course, observe the removal closely through serial photography.

3. The Secretary has asked that if the discussion of this point leads to complications, including the character of U.S. assurances and the need for long-term safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, Messrs. Stevenson and McCloy are to refer the questions back to Washington for consideration by the NSC and the President.

4. If Kuznetsov is not familiar with the message, or with the channel being used for its transmission, the U.S. negotiator should not enlighten him.

5. The assurances, present U.S. position can be simply stated: the President has already given a non-invasion assurance (to which Khrushchev has already referred publicly on several occasions.). This non-invasion assurance is of

course

TOP SECRET

course commitment on the verified removal of offensive weapons and on longer term safeguards against their re-introduction. Since the verification and safeguards depend on Cuban performances as well as Soviet performances, we await word of Mikoyan's efforts to secure Castro's cooperation with United Nations inspection machinery to which Chairman Khrushchev has repeatedly referred.

6. In this connection, Mikoyan's speech last night in Havana, in which he endorsed Castro's unacceptable five points, was not at all helpful. We hope that he is being more helpful in private.

**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

5/1/EXCISE  
(13)

RECORDED 15-1-1962

ABA - Mr. Martin

Mr. Cleveland has asked if you would review the attached memorandum as soon as possible and give him any comments you may have directly.

William E. Bruebeck

SECRET Attachment

Attachment:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDG/MR

REVIEWED BY R. B. Dunn Jr. DATE 3/1/98  
 RELEASE  DECLASSIFY  
 EXCISE  DECLASSIFY in PART  
 DENY  Non-responsive Info.  
 NOE, EO or PA exemptions (1)

TS authority to: \_\_\_\_\_ OAIB  
 CLASSIFY as \_\_\_\_\_ OAIB  
 DOWNGRADING TS to ( ) 3 or ( ) 1 OAIB

RECORDED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

三

1373

November 13, 1962

## 20. *U. S. Fish and Game* Bull.

FROM : 10 - Marlan Cleveland

**SUBJECT:** Supplementary Instructions for  
Messrs. Stevenson and McCloy.

1. The meeting at 3:00 p.m. is being held at Kuznetsov's request. The character of the meeting can therefore be developed from the opening presentation by the Soviets.

2. The Secretary has orally authorized Mr. Hoffman to discuss, if it comes up naturally in the conversation, the substance of the message sent to the Soviets last night: that if they will give us assurances that the IL-28 bombers will be removed from Cuba, within, say, three weeks, we are prepared to lift the quarantine forthwith without awaiting the actual removal of the bombers. We will, of course, observe the removal closely through aerial photography.

**TOP SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

we await word of Mikoyan's efforts to secure Castro's cooperation with United Nations inspection machinery to which Chairman Khrushchev has repeatedly referred.

6. In this connection, Mikoyan's speech last night in Havana, in which he endorsed Castro's unacceptable five points, was not at all helpful. We hope that he is being more helpful in private.

~~TOP SECRET~~

RG:msb